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Theologians often reflect on the ethical uses and impacts of artificial intelligence, but when it comes 
to artificial intelligence techniques themselves, some have questioned whether much exists to 
discuss in the first place. If the significance of computational operations is attributed rather than 
intrinsic, what are we to say about them? Ancient thinkers—namely Augustine of Hippo (lived 354–
430)—break the impasse, enabling us to draw forth the moral and metaphysical significance of 
current developments like the “deep neural networks” that are responsible for some of the most 
remarkable achievements of the past few years. First, Augustine’s theology of the natural world’s 
rationes seminales makes sense of neural networks’ success by explaining the world as a 
kaleidoscopic refraction of divine Wisdom rather than as a collection of discrete objects standing in 
crisp relations. Second, his account of interpretive judgment as a moral act bound up with love 
reveals how our training and use of AI relates to the Christian’s assimilation to Wisdom. The 
contingent meaning of the neural network reveals AI’s potential either for standing between us and 
the world or in some sense facilitating a Christian’s regathering of the created echoes of divine 
Wisdom throughout his or her journey into the Trinity. 
Introduction1 
Theology has much to say about the ethical implications of artificial intelligence and our use of it, 
but if we turn to AI itself, we run up against the question as to whether there is much there to 
discuss in the first place. Theologian David Bentley Hart trenchantly argues that the physical states 
of a programmed computer “have meanings only so long as they are objects of the representing 
mind’s attention.”2 At greater length: 
 
* Corresponding author. Department of Philosophy and Religion, Hillsdale College, Hillsdale MI, USA 49242; 
e-mail: jwales@hillsdale.edu. 
1 For the development of this paper, I am indebted to too many persons to list, but I must thank the patience of 
the JMT editors, the insight of the two anonymous reviewers, as well as John Cavadini, Thomas Clemmons, 
Matthew Gaetano, Brian P. Green, Andrew Kuiper, Dwight Lindley, Anselm Ramelow, David C. Schindler, John 
Sehorn, Ezra Sullivan, Marga Vega, and Marius Dorobantu. Each contributed important insights or commented on 
portions of the paper. The rest of you know who you are. The deficiencies of the final product have only me for their 
author. 
2 David Bentley Hart, “Consciousness (Chit),” in The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss (New 
Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2013), 218. 
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[T]he operations of a computer are merely physical events devoid of meaning . . . . 
[A] computer does not even really compute. We compute, using it as a tool. . . . [I]ts 
operations are not determined by any semantic content but only by binary 
sequences that mean nothing in themselves. The visible figures that appear on the 
computer’s screen are only the electronic traces of sets of binary correlates, and 
they serve as symbols only when we represent them as such, and assign them 
intelligible significances.3 
In other words, it would seem, not only is it impossible for a programmed computer ever to 
constitute a mind of the sort that humans have; computers themselves are naught but systems of 
signs that exist as signs only at the whim of the beholder. 
Rhetorically, at least, this view is not without its difficulties. The claim, for instance, that we 
compute seems stretched to breaking by AI systems that convert Swedish into English or identify 
fingerprints by self-generated formulae that even the systems’ designers cannot comprehend. How 
can something have a merely observer-dependent meaning when it seems reliably tuned to the 
world in ways unfathomable to us? While Hart’s position certainly excludes a programmed 
computer from being a mind, it is not so threatening to the reality or the meaningfulness of 
computation as it may seem. As with printed text, we assign both functions and semantic content 
to tools and computers based on culturally shared intentional frames (“intentionality” here refers 
not to voluntariness but to “aboutness”) that determine the design (and our interpretation) of, for 
instance, a screwdriver’s handle, a computer’s output images, and the printed characters on a page. 
As observer-dependent realities, our artifacts are contingent but they are not arbitrary.4 
Most interesting for a moral-theological consideration of AI is the way in which observer-
attributed meanings are tied up with the device’s service of our purposes—which raises the 
question of how an AI system mediates between our goals and the world with which it engages. I 
propose to explore the observer-dependent and world-attuned dimensions of AI by characterizing 
them in light of theological loci both moral (the spiritual life) and metaphysical (the doctrine of 
creation). So doing, I hope to facilitate further explorations of topics that, heretofore, have received 
comparatively little theological attention. 
For this project I draw especially on Augustine of Hippo (lived 354–430), who attended to 
human interpretation of the world within a Christian understanding of reality. His writings are 
respected by many Western Christian traditions and, on points relevant to my enterprise, are in 
 
3 Hart, 219. 
4 Amie L. Thomasson, “Artifacts and Mind-Independence: Comments on Lynne Rudder Baker’s ‘The Shrinking 
Difference between Artifacts and Natural Objects,’” APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8, no. 1 (2008): 
25–26. This is the case even for Piccinini’s “mechanistic” account of computation, in which computation is defined 
not by any semantic content but by the manipulation of non-semantic machine states in line with some 
mechanistically specified rule. Semantic content can be assigned, of course, but it is not necessary to the definition 
of computation itself; see Gualtiero Piccinini, “Computers,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89, no. 1 (2008): 32–
73, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00309.x; Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015). Even Piccinini, however, acknowledges that shared human purposes (in which we 
participate by our use of input/output devices) are necessary to fix the level of description wherein the mechanism is 
defined. Paul Schweizer therefore urges that even a mechanistic account is ultimately observer-dependent although 
not, therefore, arbitrary; see Paul Schweizer, “Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account,” in 
On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence: Themes from IACAP 2016, ed. Don 
Berkich and Matteo Vincenzo d’Alfonso, Philosophical Studies Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 
2019), 27–47, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_2. Still other positions might be taken, but at this time I 
find Piccinini, as modified by Schweizer, persuasive enough to move forward. 
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broad agreement even with those Eastern traditions in which he is less esteemed. I make three 
claims: 
First, Augustine’s theology of creation, with its metaphysics of rationes seminales, makes 
sense of failures and successes of different AI methods by explaining the world as God’s self-
expression, a kaleidoscopic refraction of his Wisdom rather than a collection of discrete objects 
standing in crisp relations. 
Second, these ontological considerations can be united to Augustine’s account of interpretive 
judgment as a moral act bound up with love, in order to reveal the network as a kind of artifactual 
memory that maps between the world and human purposes—without, that is, being able to 
accommodate the transcendent framing of the spiritual life. This points to a danger—that the 
network will, as a replacement for the world, reduce reality in our eyes to the scope of what is 
measurable by this-worldly ambitions. On the other hand, if not a replacement for but a pointer to 
reality, the network might, in some way, become part of a Christian’s regathering of the created 
echoes of divine Wisdom along our journey into the Trinity. 
1. Natural Wisdom, or AI’s Challenge to Metaphysics: What is the World? 
1.1. “Symbolic” AI and its Ontological and Epistemological Failures 
What computer scientists have called “artificial intelligence” has always reflected something of 
how their times have interpreted both human beings (as interpreters and agents) and the world (as 
object of interpretation and action). Somewhat following Thomas Hobbes, the dominant AI of the 
1950s through the 1980s5—now called “symbolic” or “Good Old-Fashioned” AI (GOFAI)—was 
philosophically founded on the “computationalist” hypothesis that thinking simply is the logical 
manipulation of symbolically represented information. 6  A properly programmed computer, 
accomplishing this task, would in fact be “thinking;” “a computer running a program that models 
 
5 On the history of AI , see Nils J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and 
Achievements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Or, popularly, see Luke Dormehl, Thinking 
Machines: The Quest for Artificial Intelligence—and Where It’s Taking Us Next (New York: TarcherPerigee, 2017). 
The most widely used introductory textbook on AI is Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A 
Modern Approach, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2009). For clarity, I sometimes pass over distinctions that 
can be drawn between AI as human-like action (e.g. the Turing Test in the 50’s), AI as human-like thought (e.g. 
Newell and Simon’s early work with symbolic representation in the 60’s, leading to the field of cognitive modeling), 
AI as rational deliberation (e.g. logicism and expert systems in the 80’s), and AI as rational agency (e.g. intelligent 
robots); on which see Russell and Norvig, 1–33. 
6 This intuition, a species of the Computational Theory of Mind (or “Computationalism”), was formalized as the 
“Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis,” seminally described in Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, “Computer 
Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,” Communications of the ACM 19, no. 3 (March 1976): 113–26, 
https://doi.org/10.1145/360018.360022. The authors conclude: “[I]ntelligence resides in physical symbol systems. 
This is computer science’s most basic law of qualitative structure. Symbol systems are collections of patterns and 
processes, the latter being capable of producing, destroying and modifying the former. The most important 
properties of patterns is [sic] that they can designate objects, processes, or other patterns, and that, when they 
designate processes, they can be interpreted. Interpretation means carrying out the designated process. The two most 
significant classes of symbol systems with which we are acquainted are human and computers.” Thus Newell and 
Simon, 125. For a recent assessment, see Nils J. Nilsson, “The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis: Status and 
Prospects,” in 50 Years of Artificial Intelligence, ed. Max Lungarella et al., vol. 4850 (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2007), 9–17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77296-5_2.  
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a human cognitive process is itself engaged in that cognitive process.”7 Under this paradigm, a 
computer program that diagrammed a sentence and constructed a plausible response could be said 
to have understood that sentence.8 Symbolic AI’s greatest achievement was in “expert systems”—
great structures of linked rules that, when queried, would generate a list of possible answers, 
perhaps posing further questions to the user in order to prune the tree of possible resolutions. The 
most thrilling application of such systems was the Deep Blue chess computer that in 1997 defeated 
reigning world champion Gary Kasparov by winning two out of six games and playing to a draw 
in the other three.9 
With time, however, symbolic AI came up against practical limits that suggested philosophical 
problems in the paradigm’s ontological and epistemological assumptions. Ontologically, symbolic 
AI worked with pre-defined sets of discrete categories standing in definite relations with one 
another. This diluted rationalism of innate ideas could easily implement Aristotelian 
syllogisms10—e.g. I wish to be dry in the rain; an umbrella will keep me dry in the rain; I will use 
my umbrella when it rains—but it did not yield a generalized capacity to deal directly with the 
world and human knowledge of it. Expert systems could break down in subtle situations wherein 
the interactions of tens of thousands of rules yielded unexpected and incorrect behaviors.11 The 
incompletely understood congeries of factors bearing on the interpretation of a phrase or the 
outcome of an action made symbolic AI difficult to apply beyond constrained situations.12 Nor 
could it represent or reason effectively about knowledge less precisely defined or more naturally 
 
7 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Routledge, 2010), 160. “Computationalism, or the 
computational theory of mind, is the view that cognition, human or otherwise, is information processing, and that 
information processing is computation over symbolic representations according to syntactic rules, rules that are 
sensitive only to the shapes of these representations. On this view . . . there is nothing more to a cognitive process 
than what is captured in a computer program successfully modeling it.” Prominent advocates of some form of 
computationalism include Daniel Dennett and Steven Pinker; see Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria to Bach and 
Back: The Evolution of Minds, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017); Steven Pinker, How the Mind 
Works (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); Steven Pinker, “So How Does the Mind Work?,” Mind & 
Language 20, no. 1 (February 2005): 1–24. 
8 See Bertram Raphael, “SIR: A Computer Program for Semantic Information Retrieval” (Cambridge, Mass., 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964), 42, AI Technical Reports (AITR-220), 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/6904. Even more comfortably asserting the identity of the computer’s functioning with 
true understanding is Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry 
into Human Knowledge Structures (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977). This was the book that 
occasioned John Searle’s much-discussed rebuttal, the “Chinese Room” argument; in “Minds, Brains, and 
Programs,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 417–57. 
9 On expert systems, see Nilsson, Quest for Artificial Intelligence, 229–40. On Deep Blue, see 481–84; Murray 
Campbell, A. Joseph Hoane, and Feng-hsiung Hsu, “Deep Blue,” Artificial Intelligence 134, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 
57–83, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00129-1. 
10 See Aristotle, “Analytica Priora [Selections],” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, Reprint 
(New York: Modern Library, 2001), sec. I.2, 24b18-20. 
11 Nilsson, Quest for Artificial Intelligence, 326. 
12 Such problems embrace both “combinatorial explosion” (the intractable multiplication of factors in a rule-
governed and search-based AI such as an expert systems) and the “qualification problem” (the impossibility of 
listing all preconditions for successful action). Combinatorial explosion was a special focus of the infamous 
Lighthill report, seen as responsible for a raft of funding cuts throughout Europe in the 1970s; see James Lighthill, 
“Artificial Intelligence: A General Survey,” in Artificial Intelligence: A Paper Symposium (Science Research 
Council, 1973), http://www.chilton-computing.org.uk/inf/literature/reports/lighthill_report/p001.htm. These are 
related, in turn, to the “frame problem” (the impossibility of knowing which information is relevant and which can 
be ignored in the prediction of an action’s effects). 
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contoured, such as, for instance, one’s sense of propriety in a social situation or one’s route through 
a tangled wood. 
Today, many problems of explosive scale in symbolic reasoning have been resolved.13 Guided 
by heuristic rules of thumb, logic engines like Doug Lenat’s “Cyc” selectively traverse vast 
datasets of discrete categories and relations to analyze business practices and anticipate terrorist 
activity.14 Still, the fundamental weaknesses of symbolic methods remain: They falter wherever 
discrete categories are difficult to detect, are unknown, or are too subtly intertwined. This is true 
for problems that humans handle poorly (e.g. weather prediction) and that they can do well (e.g. 
behavioral prediction; language interpretation and translation; face recognition). Especially hard 
are tasks in which humans attain to refined and effective sensibilities that they find difficult to 
articulate conceptually (e.g. aesthetics, improvisation, humor, and Go). In the words of Deep Blue 
architect Murray Campbell, human intelligence “is very pattern recognition-based and intuition-
based,” unlike symbolic AI’s “search intensive” methods that can require checking “billions of 
possibilities.”15 
Computer scientist and philosopher Brian Cantwell Smith argues that symbolic AI cannot 
provide a complete solution because its basic assumed ontology is inaccurate. The world, he writes, 
does not come “chopped up into neat, ontologically discrete objects” at human scale, “standing in 
unambiguous relations.”16 That the world seems that way is only because its ontological messiness 
has been made tractable by our human epistemology. Our ability to register the world, to apprehend 
it richly while coming to know individual objects, passing easily from sensation to conceptual 
 
13 John McCarthy pioneered approaches to combinatorial explosion, the qualification problem, and the frame 
problem with his “Circumscription: A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning,” Artificial Intelligence, Special Issue on 
Non-Monotonic Logic, 13, no. 1 (April 1980): 27–39, https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(80)90011-9. Murray 
Shanahan writes, recently: “Although improvements and extensions continue to be found, it is fair to say that the 
dust has settled, and that the frame problem, in its technical guise, is more-or-less solved” (emphasis added); in 
Murray Shanahan, “The Frame Problem,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 
2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/frame-problem/. Citing Murray Shanahan, Solving the Frame 
Problem: A Mathematical Investigation of the Common Sense Law of Inertia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); 
Vladimir Lifschitz, “The Dramatic True Story of the Frame Default,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 44, no. 2 
(April 2015): 163–76, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-014-9332-8. 
14 Now deployed as Lucid.ai, developed by Cycorp Inc. See popular accounts at: Cade Metz, “One Genius’ 
Lonely Crusade to Teach a Computer Common Sense,” Wired, March 24, 2016, 
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/doug-lenat-artificial-intelligence-common-sense-engine/; Doug Lenat, “Not Good 
As Gold: Today’s AI’s Are Dangerously Lacking In AU (Artificial Understanding),” Forbes, February 18, 2019, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/02/18/not-good-as-gold-todays-ais-are-dangerously-lacking-in-
au-artificial-understanding/. For scholarly literature, see Douglas B. Lenat, “CYC: A Large-Scale Investment in 
Knowledge Infrastructure,” Communications of the ACM 38, no. 11 (November 1, 1995): 33–38, 
https://doi.org/10.1145/219717.219745; Abhishek Sharma, Michael J Witbrock, and Keith M Goolsbey, “Controlling 
Search in Very Large Commonsense Knowledge Bases: A Machine Learning Approach,” Advances in Cognitive 
Systems, June 2016; Abhishek Sharma and Keith M. Goolsbey, “Simulation-Based Approach to Efficient 
Commonsense Reasoning in Very Large Knowledge Bases,” Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 1360–67, https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011360. 
15 Larry Greenemeier and Murray Campbell, “20 Years after Deep Blue: How AI Has Advanced since 
Conquering Chess,” Scientific American, June 2, 2017, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/20-years-after-
deep-blue-how-ai-has-advanced-since-conquering-chess/. 
16 Brian Cantwell Smith, The Promise of Artificial Intelligence: Reckoning and Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2019), 28, 8. See also Smith, 34–35. I do not embrace all of Smith’s metaphysical positions, but he is an 
exciting interlocutor. 
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thought, is something prior to the syllogism. Aristotle called this “abstraction.”17 In abstraction, 
something apprehended through the senses (e.g. this round taut-skinned tart-tasting misshapen 
sphere), comes to be understood consciously18 as an instance of some more general category (e.g. 
plum)—that is, from sensation one comes to understand some thing. We do this easily, both 
recognizing objects and sensing their relations to one another, but it is ill accounted-for by the 
methods of symbolic AI, which proved clumsy and brittle when it came to distinguishing and 
identifying objects captured on camera or human words recorded through a microphone—tasks 
that were once expected to be easy in comparison to supposedly higher-level activities such as 
playing chess.  
Crucially, according to Smith, our conceptualization of objects in the world is a form of 
judgment, not false but still deeply contingent and partial. We can meaningfully engage in 
discursive logical reasoning, but this is because the abstractions flowing from our judgments 
remain grounded by our sensibility for their situatedness in a world not fungible with a finite set 
of symbols. This contextualization, more than a rule of thumb, is necessary for true reasoning. 
Otherwise, as Smith says of symbolic AI, our conceptual symbolizations will “float free of reality,” 
potentially “devolv[ing] . . . into an endless play of signifiers, signifying nothing.”19 Not only do 
we need context; the world’s richness and our sensitivity to it always exceed our explicitly stated 
concepts. We cannot, Smith argues, define a finite set of discrete categories—let alone define and 
detect in the real world the finite set of discrete features by which to identify something as 
belonging to those categories—that would lead to consistent and reliable performance for purely 
symbolic AI. There is more to the world, and more to thinking, than symbolic AI assumed. 
1.2.  “Non-Symbolic” or “Statistical” AI 
The problems cited above, along with immense advances in computing power, have brought recent 
eminence to so-called “non-symbolic” or “statistical” AI, a set of methods among which artificial 
neural networks hold greatest fame.20 An artificial neural network is a computer program that 
 
17 Aristotle, “De Anima,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, Reprint (New York: Modern 
Library, 2001), sec. III.4; “Metaphysica,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, Reprint (New York: 
Modern Library, 2001), sec. I.1; “Physica,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, Reprint (New 
York: Modern Library, 2001), sec. I.1. See also Allan Bäck, “The Conception of Abstraction,” in Aristotle’s Theory 
of Abstraction, The New Synthese Historical Library (Springer International Publishing, 2014), 7–26, 
https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319047584. 
18 “Consciously,” i.e. as a conscious experience. While not agreeing with all of his positions, I will take 
philosopher John Searle’s stab at a popularly accessible definition : “[T]he central feature of consciousness is that 
for any conscious state there is something that it feels like to be in that state, some qualitative character to the state. 
For example, the qualitative character of drinking beer is different from that of listening to music or thinking about 
your income tax. This qualitative character is subjective in that it only exists as experienced by a human or animal 
subject. It has a subjective or first-person existence (or “ontology”), unlike mountains, molecules, and tectonic plates 
that have an objective or third-person existence. Furthermore, qualitative subjectivity always comes to us as part of a 
unified conscious field. At any moment you do not just experience the sound of the music and the taste of the beer, 
but you have both as part of a single, unified conscious field, a subjective awareness of the total conscious 
experience. So the feature we are trying to explain is qualitative, unified subjectivity.” Thus John R. Searle, “Can 
Information Theory Explain Consciousness?,” The New York Review of Books, January 10, 2013, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/01/10/can-information-theory-explain-consciousness/. 
19 Smith, Promise of Artificial Intelligence, 73. 
20 Among the great variety of statistical methods, I focus on these because they are both the most prominent 
method and the greatest source of the sort of “bias” that I discuss here. The artificial neural network (ANN) was 
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mathematically simulates an interconnected set of simplified brain neurons. As an AI technique, 
then, it begins less from an interpretation of what human thinking is than from an analogy with its 
biological aspects. That is, the goal of such networks is not so much human-like reasoning as it is 
neuron-like data-processing.21 Having some affinity with the British empiricist tradition, these 
methods are far less beholden to assumptions about either ontology or epistemology than are the 
techniques of symbolic AI.22 
An artificial neural network receives a pattern of information as numerical values at its input 
nodes, which are connected with various strengths to layer upon layer of further nodes. At each 
node, when the sum of the incoming connections exceeds some pre-set threshold, that node will 
fire and its own signal will be transmitted variously to nodes on a further layer, and so on. If you 
put in a pattern at the beginning, it is transformed as its elements are recombined and processed 
until something else comes out on the final layer of the network. A network can be “trained” to 
produce the desired behavior—say, to predict travel patterns or recognize faces—by adjusting the 
strengths of its connections, thus adjusting the contribution made by each node to each 
recombination and, in due course, to the final result. A piano offers a poor analogy but a useful 
image. If you have ever shouted into the instrument with its sustaining pedal held down, then you 
have heard its tuned strings resonate with the different frequencies of your shout. One receives 
back a sort of echo, not of one’s words but of the tones of one’s voice. Similarly, as a neural 
network is tuned (i.e. as its connection strengths are adjusted), it begins to resonate with the 
entangled relations that are implicit in our world, including relations that cannot easily be discerned 
or logically represented by human investigators. But by its training, the network does not just echo; 
it transforms its input in order to make explicit the relations that are of interest to the trainer. 
 
given its original form in Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in 
Nervous Activity,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 (1943): 115–33. For a time, this technique was neglected 
after Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert’s critique of single-layer networks’ inability to perform certain elementary 
logical functions (e.g. XOR); see Perceptrons: An Introduction to Computational Geometry, 1st ed. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1969). However, fifteen years later, Rumelhart et al. described a method for training multi-layer 
networks, in David E. Rumelhart, Geoffrey E. Hinton, and Ronald J. Williams, “Learning Representations by Back-
Propagating Errors,” Nature 323 (October 1986): 533–36, https://doi.org/10.1038/323533a0. Nonetheless, in 1987, 
Minsky and Papert released an “Expanded Edition” of their book in 1987, refining and restating the limitations of 
ANNs. Perceptrons is often accorded a causal role in the “AI winter” of the 70s through the 90s, a decline of 
research in light of the perceived limits of both “symbolic” methods and ANNs; see Mikel Olazaran, “A 
Sociological Study of the Official History of the Perceptrons Controversy,” Social Studies of Science 26, no. 3 
(1996): 611–59, https://www.jstor.org/stable/285702. The current renaissance of ANN techniques, specifically 
“Deep Learning” (neural networks with many layers) began in 2012 with AlexNet, a deep convolutional network 
capable of amazing feats of image recognition; Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton, “ImageNet 
Classification with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks,” Communications of the ACM 60, no. 6 (May 24, 2017): 
84–90, https://doi.org/10.1145/3065386; Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton, “Deep Learning,” 
Nature 521 (May 28, 2015), http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hinton/absps/NatureDeepReview.pdf. 
21 To say that ANNs are non-symbolic does not mean that they are irreconcilable with computationalism. 
Moreover, it may be that they could be considered “symbolic” at the appropriate scale. See discussion of these two 
controverted issues in Michael Rescorla, “The Computational Theory of Mind,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/computational-mind/.  
22 They are not wholly empiricist, but have certain predetermined architectural features, with the debate 
centering on whether these are domain-general features (as empiricists would claim to be the case in the human 
brain) or domain-specific, which would entail some “nativist” or quasi-rationalist innateness in their ‘interpretive’ 
action; thus Cameron Buckner, “Deep Learning: A Philosophical Introduction,” Philosophy Compass 14, no. 10 
(2019): 11–12, https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12625. 
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Neural networks and other statistical methods subserve the AI that underlies self-driving cars, 
programs that beat world champions in the games of Go and chess,23 the voice recognition of Siri 
and Alexa, 24  Google Translate, 25  webmail autocomplete functions, 26  and the “curated” 
recommendations delivered by Spotify, Netflix, and Amazon. 27  Many problems that bedevil 
symbolic methods can be solved handily by a neural network because, in a manner of speaking, 
the network is receptive to, imprinted by the structure of the world as presented to it. We might 
say that it develops a point of view: Not a conscious experience, but something like the classical 
notion of the mind’s conformity to a thing28—although here that conformity is always constrained 
by the task for which the AI is trained. But to what is it conformed? To answer that question, we 
need a richer ontology. 
1.3. Concept and Context 
Symbolic AI’s treatment of the world has a long pedigree that finds analogues in certain streams 
of ancient Greek thought, for which to understand a thing—be it natural object or human-made 
artifact—was to apprehend rationally its “form” or “idea,” its configuration toward some function 
or use. According to Langdon Gilkey, for such thinkers, 
once the scientist has uncovered this form of the object, . . . he really knows all he 
can or need know about it; he has penetrated to the very heart of reality. He does 
not need to experience or describe any further its external characteristics or patterns 
 
23 David Silver et al., “Mastering the Game of Go without Human Knowledge,” Nature 550, no. 7676 (October 
19, 2017): 354–59, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature24270; David Silver et al., “Mastering Chess and Shogi by Self-
Play with a General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm,” ArXiv:1712.01815 [Cs], December 5, 2017, 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01815. 
24 Sree Hari Krishnan Parthasarathi and Nikko Strom, “Lessons from Building Acoustic Models with a Million 
Hours of Speech,” ArXiv:1904.01624 [Cs, Eess, Stat], April 2, 2019, http://arxiv.org/abs/1904.01624; Brian Barrett, 
“Alexa’s Had a Big Year, Mostly Thanks to Machine Learning,” Wired, December 19, 2018, 
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-alexa-2018-machine-learning/. 
25 Yonghui Wu et al., “Google’s Neural Machine Translation System: Bridging the Gap between Human and 
Machine Translation,” ArXiv, no. 1609.08144v2 (September 26, 2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.08144; Cade 
Metz, “An Infusion of AI Makes Google Translate More Powerful Than Ever,” Wired, September 27, 2016, 
https://www.wired.com/2016/09/google-claims-ai-breakthrough-machine-translation/; Gideon Lewis-Kraus, “The 
Great A.I. Awakening,” The New York Times Magazine, December 14, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html; Douglas Hofstadter, “The 
Shallowness of Google Translate,” The Atlantic, January 30, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/the-shallowness-of-google-translate/551570/. 
26 Yonghui Wu, “Smart Compose: Using Neural Networks to Help Write Emails,” Google AI Blog (blog), May 
16, 2018, http://ai.googleblog.com/2018/05/smart-compose-using-neural-networks-to.html. 
27 Heng-Tze Cheng et al., “Wide & Deep Learning for Recommender Systems,” in Proceedings of the 1st 
Workshop on Deep Learning for Recommender Systems - DLRS 2016 (Boston, Mass.: ACM Press, 2016), 7–10, 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2988450.2988454; Faisal Siddiqi, “Machine Learning Platform Meetup: Recap of the Oct 
2017 ML Platform Meetup at Netflix HQ,” Netflix TechBlog (blog), October 18, 2017, https://medium.com/netflix-
techblog/machine-learning-platform-meetup-ddec090f3c17. 
28 E.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [1265-1273], ed. The Aquinas Institute (Emmaus Academic, 2012), 
sec. I.16.1 co.: “knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower” and the “truth [of one’s own thoughts] 
is the equation of thought and thing.” See also Thomas Aquinas, I.16.3; Truth: A Translation of Quaestiones 
Disputatae De Veritate, trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Regnery Publishing, 1952), sec. 1.1. One’s apprehension of the 
world is not just a symbolic representation of an account of it, but is a world-conformed habit of mind from which 
such accounts and their representations are generated. One’s capacity for understanding is shaped by one’s 
experience and one’s memory, and accompanies one in every experience. 
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of behavior, since, with its form in his mind, he can predict all that is important 
about its activities and powers.29 
Gilkey objects not when the particular item is seen as a member of some category, but when all of 
its “sensible characteristics” (e.g. a knife’s gleam) beyond those necessitated by its form (e.g. its 
cutting edge) are treated as mere byproducts of the “necessary but distorting . . . . substratum [that 
has been] arranged according to the guiding principle” of the form.30 In the latter view, these 
byproducts may be discarded from consideration as meaningless “result[s] of unpredictable flaws 
in the material and so quite beyond rational explanation.”31 
This rendering of ancient Greek science strikingly echoes the formalistic world-model assumed 
by symbolic AI,32 which Smith finds inadequate both to physical realities and to how we apprehend 
them: “[T]aking the world to consist of discrete intelligible mesoscale objects is an achievement 
of intelligence, not a premise on top of which intelligence runs.”33 The concepts by which the 
world is discretized (i.e. the forms, as Gilkey would call them) do represent reality but they are 
engagements with it rather than separable simulations of it. They are instruments by which we 
interact with the world at a particular but non-exhaustive level of description.  Only as points of 
contact with their real-world context do they remain true to it. Therefore, especially in “long chains 
of articulated reasoning” about realities unavailable to immediate experience, our highly abstracted 
formal concepts must remain habitually “embedded” in their underlying “sub-conceptual webs” 
so that from this context we may draw the “subtleties, adjustments, and so on” that will give 
“nuance and inflection” to inferences immediate and distant.34 By this embedding, articulated 
reasoning can be a true engagement with rather than a reduction of the world. 
Smith derives his understanding of the “sub-conceptual” from the success of today’s “deep” 
neural networks, which have broad input layers and dozens of interior layers. “When fed with data 
obtained directly from low-level sensors” such as cameras, the “high-dimensionality” of the 
network’s layers, enable it “to ‘encode’ all kinds of subtlety and nuance . . . [without] hav[ing] to 
categorize and discretize their inputs at the outset.” Its self-adjusting weightings, which “store and 
work with” the input, come subtly to reflect entanglements between phenomena in the data. Like 
the cultivation of a sommelier’s palate, this progressive attunement to the world’s “‘sub-conceptual’ 
terrain” renders the network effective in a way that pre-categorization by formal ontologies would 
never have permitted.35 
The nature of this sub-conceptual terrain is, however, difficult to explore because, as physicist 
Judea Pearl writes, neural networks are “opaque.” Even when tuned to their training data and able 
to generalize to new data, their interior sensitivities are not at all easily interpreted.36 Eminent 
computer scientist Peter Norvig argues that their statistical attunement “describes what does 
happen” but—“mak[ing] no claim to correspond to the generative process used by nature”—it 
 
29 Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth: A Study of the Christian Doctrine of Creation, Anchor Books 
Ed. (Doubleday, 1965), 124. 
30 Gilkey, 123–24. 
31 Gilkey, 126–27.  
32 See Gilkey, 123–24.  
33 Smith, Promise of Artificial Intelligence, 35. 
34 Smith, 74–75. On these sub-conceptual webs, see also Smith, 34–35.  
35 Smith, Promise of Artificial Intelligence, 58–59. It has been proposed that deep networks find inherent 
symmetries in the data manifolds, to yield useful relations and to encode a large amount of this data See Buckner, 
“Deep Learning,” 9–11. 
36 Judea Pearl, “The Limitations of Opaque Learning Machines,” in Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of 
Looking at AI, ed. John Brockman, 1st ed. (New York: Penguin Press, 2019), 18. 
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“doesn’t answer the question of why.”37 Norvig’s statement is of ambiguous value. True, networks 
do not develop theoretical models, but if Smith is right, then the network may say quite a bit, even 
if obscurely. How could nature’s “sub-conceptual” not be somehow related to the deep flow of its 
“generative process[es],” especially if this sub-conceptual gives our theoretical concepts their 
success as engagements with nature itself? 
To develop a joint account of nature and of networks, let us reflect on what the “sub-conceptual” 
might be. Consider a hypothetical (but technologically realistic) neural network, trained to 
distinguish grasses, wildflowers, and trees with fidelity to distinct scientific categories. 38  In 
“earlier” layers, we might observe activity quite out of keeping with these hierarchical 
classifications as, for instance, if certain areas were to be equally highly activated by the subtle 
ridging on a blade of grass, the stalk of a valerian wildflower, and the needles of certain conifers. 
Were this but a matter of surface-level similarity with no more conceptual heft than the redness of 
a coral snake grouped with that of a red panda, then we might agree that the network’s processes 
“bear no relation” to nature’s “generative process[es].” But what if the network has captured 
features that give us access to Smith’s “sub-conceptual web”? The visual similarities of grass, stalk, 
and needle are not mere surface coincidence. A ridged configuration strengthens these plants’ 
narrow structures, which are mostly hollow but must remain stiff to perform their function. In 
grouping these three, then, the neural network is attuned to what we know to be a manifested 
harmonization of gravity, force of wind, capillary action, and—in the movement of fluid—a hint 
of metabolism. These three plants are not at all closely related nor all common to the same 
environment; yet, as expressions of this kingdom of life, they have settled into a groove that 
expresses something not only about these particular organisms or even their local environment, 
but also about natural harmony of the earth as a whole. 
All this is taken into the absorbent mind of the attentive child; it is forgotten amidst the 
classifications by seed, climate, and species in an introductory biology class; and it is rediscovered 
by the botanist and the gardener. It is like the sounding of a piano note, which bears witness not 
only to the struck key but also, in its overtones, to the shape of the piano; or the ineffably subtle 
differences in sound that bear witness to the species of wood from which the piano is constructed, 
or even—perhaps discernible only by a neural network—the orientation of the grain, even the 
history of a particular tree reflected in its physical quirks. 
For a reductively formalistic science, the three plants’ ridges mislead because we ought better 
to define their forms by macroscale physical characteristics, climates, and modes of nutrition and 
reproduction. For the same science, all that I have written of the piano falls among the “sensible 
characteristics” that may be discarded upon grasping the intelligible form of the keyed instrument. 
Against such a view, I contend that this sort of thing is what we have meant by “piano” all along; 
and it is why the classically trained pianist finds something lacking in the finest electronic 
instrument, as a matter not of snobbery nor of tradition only, but of the full meaning of the piano’s 
“form.” Like the commonalities of the three plants, the distinctiveness of the instrument cannot be 
captured by abstracting from its sensible characteristics because its truest concept—the concept 
that we hold—is adequately transmitted only by the experience of the piano itself as a transduction 
of the world from which it is drawn. It is not that our formal concepts fall short of experience; it is 
 
37 Peter Norvig, “On Chomsky and the Two Cultures of Statistical Learning,” 2011, 
http://norvig.com/chomsky.html. Emphasis original. 
38 At no point, as critics rightly point out, does the network learn to see these plants as wholes; see Gary Smith, 
The AI Delusion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 50–51. Still, I see no reason why “wholes” should not 
be identifiable by a more advanced network architecture. 
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that, as we see in the sensitivity of the neural network, they embrace much more of reality than our 
way of speaking may lead us to believe. 
1.4. The rationes seminales, an Augustinian Ontology Commensurate with AI 
If our attempts to “purify” the conceptual from its sensuous matrix lead to a parody rather than to 
a more precise grasp of reality, and if concepts engage a thing’s form, then I propose to think of 
particular forms as including, not abstracting from, the harmonics of nature. Augustine of Hippo 
calls this inherently dynamic form the ratio (in Greek, the logos) of a thing. His ontology of 
rationes39 makes sense of symbolic AI’s failure and of neural networks’ successes by describing 
how particular things are inextricably at home in the world. Meanwhile, as I will describe later, his 
teaching on interpretive judgment40 clarifies how concepts are “achievements”41 that are truest 
engagements when they do not detach things from that matrix. 
The key for Augustine is contingency. Plato and the tradition emanating from him sought a 
fixed non-contingent world—i.e. the forms or ideas—in light of which the contingent and the 
shifting might be explained. For Augustine, however, there is no world of the forms. The only non-
contingent reality is God himself, a simple being, alive in love. Construed as the archetype of all 
things, his transcendent and inexhaustible life is the divine Wisdom (Prv 8), in which are the non-
contingent prototypes or “eternal reasons” (aeternas rationes) of all contingent things—not as 
distinct forms but as identical with his simple life.42 
God would not make creatures unless he knew them before he made them; nor 
would he know them unless he saw them; nor would he see them unless he 
possessed them; nor would he possess what had not yet been made except as 
uncreated being, as he is himself.43 
God’s uncreated life is single and simple. Therefore, the aeternas rationes are distinct only from 
our point of view, aspects of God seen as “simply multiple and uniformly multiform” through the 
prisms of his contingent and pluriform created expressions here below.44  
 
39 Augustine of Hippo, De Genesi Ad Litteram Libri Xii [401-415], ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 28/1 (Vienna: 
Tempsky, 1894), secs. 4–6. See, among the secondary literature, Gerald P. Boersma, “The Rationes Seminales in 
Augustine’s Theology of Creation,” Nova et Vetera 18, no. 2 (2020): 413–41, https://doi.org/10.1353/nov.2020.0030; 
Christina Hoenig, “Augustine,” in Plato’s Timaeus and the Latin Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 242–51; Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate, Reprint ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 262–69. Also, setting the rationes in wider context for today’s inquiries, see 
John C. Cavadini, “Augustine and Science,” in T&T Clark Handbook of Christian Theology and the Modern 
Sciences, ed. John P. Slattery (London: T&T Clark, 2020), 59–66. 
40 Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate Libri XV [399-419], ed. W. J. Mountain, CCSL 50, 50A (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1968), bks. 11, 14. 
41 Already quoted from Smith, Promise of Artificial Intelligence, 35. See this paper, note 33. 
42 Augustine of Hippo, Trin., sec. 12.2.2. 
43 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.16.34; The Literal Meaning of Genesis [401-415], trans. John 
Hammond Taylor, New edition, vol. 1, ACW 41 (New York, N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1982), 167. 
44 Augustine of Hippo, De Ciuitate Dei [413-427], ed. Bernhard Dombart and Alfons Kalb, CCSL 47, 48 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), sec. 12.19. See also Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.13.29-5.15.33; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 
1:164–65. Especially: “[W]hat has been made through Him is understood to be ‘life’ in Him, the life in which He 
sees all thing when He makes them. He has made them as He has seen them, not looking beyond Himself, but He 
has numbered within Himself all that He has made. His vision and that of the Father are not different: there is one 
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In the contingent world, divine Wisdom is expressed doubly: in the kinds of things created 
according to the rationes; and in God’s providential governance of the whole, whereby the ways 
of these things are expressed in interaction with one another.45 As for kinds, the nature and 
capacities displayed in the life of each created thing reflect, facet-like, the goodness and wisdom 
of God: 
[T]hrough Wisdom, all things were made; and the motion we now see in creatures, 
measured by the lapse of time as each one fulfills its proper function, comes to 
creatures from causal reasons [rationes] implanted in them, which God scattered as 
seeds at the moment of creation when He spoke and they were made; he 
commanded and they were created [Ps. 32:9].46 
While distinct, they are not treated by Augustine as separable. Somewhat as all created rationes 
are found archetypically in the one divine Wisdom, each plant and animal has its common origin 
in the causality of the one earth that “received the power of bringing them forth” (cf. Gen 1:12).47 
Herein is contained, in nuce from the very beginning of the universe, the meaningfulness that will 
unfold in the distinction of contingent creatures. Thus God made “all things together” (Sir 18:1).48 
The second contingency—which Augustine honors as no purely platonic thinker could—is 
history itself.49 This is the sphere of God’s providential governance, not a marionette-like foisting 
of the divine will upon otherwise-free creatures, but an elicitation of their interacting harmonies 
by the unfolding of temporal events.50 
Not only does the developmental and behavioral history of a squirrel manifest more fully its 
ratio as a refraction of divine Wisdom; Wisdom is further manifested through particular things’ 
 
vision, as there is one substance;” citing Jb 28.12–13, 22–25 in Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.15.33; Literal Meaning of 
Genesis, 1:166. See also, plainly showing that these are not “moments” in God’s life, but the eternal life that is 
God’s existence, see Augustine of Hippo, Trin., sec. 4.3. Augustine affirms that nothing is “irregular or unforeseen” 
by God, because the “rationes for all things created and about to be created are contained in the mind of God,” 
“eternal and . . . unchangeable;” Ciu., sec. 12.19. See also John C. Cavadini, “God’s Eternal Knowledge According 
to St. Augustine,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump, 2nd 
ed., Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 37–59. 
45 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.12.28. Augustine distinguishes the unchangeable rationes from 
God’s work from which he rested (i.e. creatures, with their immanent rationes) and the things he produces from 
these works—that is, material things and their motions under providence according to their particular rationes. 
46 Augustine of Hippo, sec. 4.33.51. Cited by Cavadini, “Augustine and Science,” 64.  
47 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.4.11; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1:153. See also Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 
5.4.11; 6.6.10-11; 6.10.17; 6.14.25; Ernan McMullin, “Evolution as a Christian Theme” (The Herbert Reynolds 
Lecture Series, Baylor University, 2004), 7–8. 
48 See especially Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.23.44-46; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1:174–76. I 
should note that Augustine does not seem to think that the distinctions themselves are contingent within a historical 
frame. In other words, while his theory is ripe for development into a theory of biological evolution, he does not 
fully anticipate that move. For more discussion see, again, McMullin, “Evolution as a Christian Theme.”  
49 The Christian belief in God’s progressive self-revelation culminating in the Incarnation would have sensitized 
Augustine to history. We find this even in his early supposedly neoplatonic treatise De uera religione; on which see 
recently Thomas Clemmons, “The Common, History, and the Whole: Guiding Themes in De Vera Religione,” 
Augustinianum 58, no. 1 (June 28, 2018): 125–54, https://doi.org/10.5840/agstm20185816. 
50 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.11.17; 5.20.41; Cavadini, “Augustine and Science,” 64. See also 
Augustine of Hippo, Trin., sec. 3.5-6.11. And Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.21.42; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 
1:172.“Creatures shaped and born in time should teach us how we ought to regard them. For it is not without reason 
that Scripture says of Wisdom, that she graciously appears to her lovers in their paths and meets them with unfailing 
providence” (Wis. 6:17). 
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contingent histories of interaction—e.g. this squirrel in this forest, interacting with this oak tree 
and that fox. Even turbulent micro-particle systems, the “deep pools [that] seethe with tumbling 
waterfalls,” speak to harmonies moved rather than transgressed by the power of God. The whole 
of it thrums with the one uncreated ratio of divine Wisdom himself51 because the aeternas rationes, 
in their simple unity within Wisdom, have an intrinsic order (ordo) that is “hidden from us rather 
than . . . lacking to universal nature.”52 We cannot skip past history to access this order because 
“our knowledge . . . depends upon the governance in time of creatures already made, inasmuch as 
God, in the unfolding of his creatures . . . , is working still.”53 
The world is not a collection of static essences defined by distinct forms existing on a different 
plane. Because there is no distinct world of the forms, but only this world or the very mind of God 
himself, we know rationes as distinct only through historical and material existence.54 For the 
creature’s ratio is not a functional form obscured by material conditions, but a trajectory that works 
itself out through material conditions and in relation to other rationes. When we take up one ratio, 
we take up a knot in the whole tapestry. In this kaleidoscopic theophany of things, their ways, and 
their histories, the “very order, disposition, change, and motion of the world and all visible things,” 
do “silently proclaim that they could only have been made by God, the ineffably and invisibly 
great and . . . beautiful.”55  
The contingency of a particular ratio—that God did not have to make the creature that way, or 
express himself under that particular economy—is recapitulated in the contingent conditions under 
which we encounter it materially. The rationes imply and are disclosed in the messiness of nature. 
The ratio of a worm is not captured by some definition such as “fleshy flexible moving linear 
metabolizer,” if that definition does not live in the ‘silent proclamation’ of its writhing in this 
physical environment, in this soil. The “sub-conceptual” detail of the clumping earth after a light 
rain and the way it shapes the worm’s progress—a behavior adapted to that sort of soil—is not 
inconsequential but is entailed in the ratio of that creature. 
Here, then, is a fitting metaphysical account of the world’s diversity and inexpressible interior 
relations that are held in our concepts, properly used when creatures and their rationes are known 
in their coherence with one another. Herein is Wisdom apparent; herein, the measure and harmony 
of the whole draws forth our awe and wonder and praise—all of which, John Cavadini writes, 
would be denied if that whole were formalistically “reduc[ed] to our rationality” in the sense 
critiqued by Gilkey and Smith.56 For an Augustinian metaphysics of creation, the neural network 
 
51 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.20.41; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1:171–72. “God moves his 
whole creation by a hidden power, and all creatures are subject to this movement: the angels carry out his 
commands, the stars move in their courses, the winds blow now this way, now that, deep pools seethe with tumbling 
waterfalls and mists forming above them, meadows come to life as their seeds put forth the grass, animals are born 
and live their lives according to their proper instincts, the evil are permitted to try the just. It is thus that God unfolds 
the generations that he laid up in creation when first he founded it; and they would not be sent forth to run their 
course if he who made creatures ceased to exercise his provident rule over them.” 
52 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.21.42; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1:172. 
53 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.4.10; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1:153.  
54 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.16.34; Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1:167. “In him we live and move 
and have our being [Acts 17:28]; but most creatures . . . , being corporeal, are of a different nature, and our mind is 
unable to see them in God, [that is,] in the archetypes according to which they were made. [Otherwise,] . . . we 
should know their number, size, and nature, even without seeing them by means of the senses of our body.” 
55 Augustine of Hippo, Ciu., sec. 11.4.2; Augustine of Hippo, “The City of God, Against the Pagans [413–427],” 
in St. Augustine’s City of God and Christian Doctrine, trans. Marcus Dods, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First 
Series 2 (Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887).  
56 Cavadini, “Augustine and Science,” 64–65. Discussing Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 5.22.43. 
Knowledge, Wisdom, and Artifactual Memory 
W A L E S — M E TA P H Y S I C S ,  M E A N I N G ,  A N D M O R A L I T Y :  A  T H E O L O G I C A L  R E F L E C T I O N  O N  A . I .  1 4  
at its best is attuned not to happy accidents but to the rationes; the network’s mathematics do not 
refute so much as deepen our notion of the concept as an engagement with the rationes.57 
The metaphysical and epistemological challenge of the neural network has led us not to 
abandon concepts, but to see them as rooted in the historical outworking of reality through the 
activities of particular things, with histories and their kinds understood as refractions of a simple 
and unitary divine Wisdom. What, then, has the network captured when it is trained to distinguish 
images of plants according to a scientific taxonomy? Philosopher Cameron Buckner writes: 
[T]he exact boundaries of each category’s manifolds [i.e. a category’s ‘geography’ 
in the data-space] are inaccessible to networks during training; the “goal” of 
training a neural network for classification can then be understood as discovering a 
global output function—composed of individual nodes’ activation functions and 
associated link weights—that can draw boundaries between the manifolds of 
categories that need to be discriminated.58 
Certainly, the categories may be determined by the human designer, but a network that maintains 
robust performance when tested, has, in a certain way, accomplished a mapping from the rationes 
(manifested in the world-data presented to the network) to the interests of the network’s trainer. It 
has to work; and so it must preserve the rationes as much as our own categories do in experience 
even if not in explicit definition. But that also means that it can distort these rationes. 
2. Knowledge, Wisdom, and Artifactual Memory 
Having inquired into the neural network’s relation to the rationes of nature, we may now ask about 
its relation to human understanding. For the network’s outputs are classifications, categories or 
human purposes toward which the network is trained to map its input data. Here it the locus in 
which semantics have been attributed to the statistical AI. The strengths and potential deficiencies 
of this mapping will open to us a deeper moral-theological reflection: 
First, for Augustine, concepts in the human mind are begotten by intentional and moral 
judgments that, in turn, form the very fabric of our understanding as an engagement with the 
subconceptual web—much like the neural network. 
Second, while knowledge (scientia) directs these understandings toward our own purposes, 
true wisdom (sapientia) receives the rationes contemplatively, allowing them to exceed the scope 
of one’s own purposes. AI, always developed for a particular task, points beyond itself but, in 
pointing toward us before it points toward the world, seems unable to transcend a utilitarian frame.  
Third, I conclude that, as AI cannot escape the morally infused nature of all human thought, 
we must develop a “spirituality” of AI wherein we do not permit it to stand between us and the 
world—lest we remain self-imprisoned in the knowledge of our own designs. 
 
57 I do not here have space to deal with networks that discover false correlations or biased shortcuts in data, but 
I will say that such problems do not defeat the claim that the network, when attuned to a data set that is actually 
causally linked in nature, is attuned to the rationes in some measure. 
58 Buckner, “Deep Learning,” 10. Dashes added for clarity. 
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2.1. Meaning as Moral: Verbum and Memoria 
Every act of understanding involves an act of the will. For Augustine, our interpretations of 
natural things, conventional signs, and artefacts are all acts of understanding that have the same 
fundamental sequence: we apprehend something through the senses; we judge it as good (i.e. as 
real)59 with respect to something else; then, as we cling to that goodness with our approbation or 
love, we conceive a “mental word” (verbum mentis), i.e. a conceptual understanding.60 The verbum 
mentis is not a spoken word, nor an autonomous form in Gilkey’s sense, but a particular embrace 
by the mind of some facet of reality according to its ratio—an embrace, however, that is shaped 
by the knower’s own assessment of its goodness.61 For Augustine, in the words of Luigi Gioia, 
“intellectual knowledge is not the result of an ‘infusion’ in our mind of a pre-existing reality, but 
the production of a new reality.”62  
This verbum is truer as it approaches an embrace of the ratio as that ratio is; and this means 
that one’s own desire and love must conform to reality rather than plucking out from reality only 
that which is congenial to the stance that one has brought with oneself. Even our recognitions of a 
narwhal or a “no parking” sign are not neutral because our judgments of meaning take place within 
the general frame of our cultural, societal, and personal position within the world. Every act of 
understanding entails a moral judgment; and habitual moral judgments of this sort form our habit 
of seeing the world. 
Augustine calls the ground of this habitual vision our “memory” (memoria).63 The corporeal 
things that humans know cannot be kept uninterruptedly before the physical eyes. Yet memoria 
makes present the object of the mind’s striving, such that God and corporeal objects alike can be 
present uinterruptedly. The memoria is not, however, a movie-screen or a data repository.64 Rather, 
it is an implicit knowledge of objects and experiences, a fabric of varyingly accurate rationes built 
up from apprehensions in verba mentis. Contained implicitly in this fabric, objects can be said to 
be present to the mind even without conscious cognition. Desire or love for these objects—the 
will’s implicit judgment concerning the thing known—draws the object anew into explicit thought 
as a verbum mentis in the intellect. As Augustine writes in Confessions, “I hid in my memory not 
the images but the realities”—that is, the rationes as construed in the verba mentis.65 
More than permitting implicit presence, the memoria is a kind of ground for thought and 
formed by thought. One’s past apprehensions become the fibers from which one’s present intuitive 
 
59 Moral evils like murder are “good” only in, say, involving voluntary motion. However, the act itself forestalls 
any goodness beyond the bare fact of this motion, in intentionally extinguishing the goodness of one personal life by 
the agent’s ugly inter-personal attempt at absolute domination. 
60 Augustine of Hippo, Trin., bks. 11, 14. Luigi Gioia writes: “The process of knowledge is set off by desire for 
the object to be known and is completed only through union with the object known through love;”  
61 John C. Cavadini, “The Quest for Truth in Augustine’s De Trinitate,” Theological Studies 58, no. 3 
(September 1, 1997): 429–40, https://doi.org/10.1177/004056399705800302. 
62 Gioia, Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate, 200. 
63 The texts of Augustine dealing most prominently with memoria include: The Confessions [397-401], trans. 
Maria Boulding, Rev. ed., WSA, I/1 (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2001), 10. Trin., 9; 14; 15.19, 20. On the 
verbum mentis see Augustine of Hippo, 9.11-12; 15.11.20. See also Nello Cipriani, “Memory,” in Augustine 
Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1999); Matthew L. Lamb, “St. Augustine on Memoria and Commemoratio,” in 
Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages, ed. Kent Emery, Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des 
Mittelalters (Boston, Mass.: Brill, 2011), 237–47. 
64 Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones [397-401], ed. James Joseph O’Donnell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 
sec. 10.17.26. 
65 Augustine of Hippo, 10.10.17. 
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leaps are made and concepts past and present are (re)woven.66 To use a mathematical analogy, the 
memoria is a set of basis vectors, more or less approaching the true principal components of a 
vector space. As built up from the verba mentis shaped by the will, the memoria constitutes the 
deep moral substructure of understanding wherein the verba of past and future subsist. Like the 
palate, the memoria is cultivated by the things that one tastes attentively and potentiates what and 
how one is able to taste. For one’s past judgments shape the memoria; and the memoria is also the 
substrate wherein the resulting verba are sustained. It is our sensitivity to reality, the primary color 
spectrum of thought, our way of seeing the world, a habit of mind shaping the judgments that will 
come readily to us, and a sort of sedimentary aggregate of the verba begotten over one’s lifetime. 
If a particular ratio is a knot in the tapestry of reality, then memoria is the corresponding tapestry 
of mind from which the verbum mentis comes forth. Yet, inasmuch as the will and the affections 
are susceptible of reformation, the memoria is malleable as well. 
2.2. Artifactual Memoria: Knowledge (Scientia) but not Wisdom (Sapientia) 
As an artifact, the programmed computer receives its semantics from the meaning-making 
intentional frame constituted by the judgments of those who share that frame. Now, if the trained 
neural network maps the rationes of some dataset to categories that are of interest to the system 
designer; and if this mapping preserves those rationes to the extent that they can be transduced 
without loss into the designer’s moral and conceptual engagement with reality; then the neural 
network is an artifactual memoria, its learned weights preserving the mapping of rationes. As with 
a network sensitive to ridged stalks, this memoria is not transparently interpretable in terms of 
scientific classifications or formal conceptual relationships, but nonetheless it encodes the rationes 
of its input data as shaped by the wills of its designers and users, mapping reality to human interest 
and utility. Thus its meaning as used in the world involves both the verba mentis that shape the 
system’s architecture and especially its trained outputs, and the moral stances implicit in the goals 
and purposes to which its users put the AI.67 When it is read as a standard, taken as a prompt for 
action, or contemplated for what it reveals, it thus has ultimate reference not to God (as with the 
rationes of the natural world) but to ourselves. 
The artifactual memoria therefore subserves what Augustine calls “knowledge” (scientia) as 
distinct from “wisdom” (sapientia). Scientia apprehends things according to their rationes for the 
sake of “action” in the “good use of temporal things.” The moral stances and judgments that beget 
a right scientia build up the “virtues that make for right living” along the way to eternal life. The 
neural network cannot mirror, however, the higher form of knowledge that is “wisdom” (sapientia). 
Sapientia engages the rationes not according to their usefulness but according as they echo the 
aeternas rationes that are one in divine Wisdom; thus it reaches toward the “contemplation of 
eternal things” in God himself.68 
 
66 Augustine of Hippo, The Trinity [399-419], trans. Edmund Hill, 1st ed., WSA, I/5 (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New 
City Press, 1991), 12.4.23. 
67 This remains the case even for apparently purely scientific uses. Weather prediction has goals and valences 
embedded in it—what we deem important, what is the difference between light and heavy rain, what effects are 
worth singling out for identification; all of these have to do with the human scale of life in the world and the interest 
that we have in it. We must delineate the concepts, else how can it enter our web of meaning? Language translation 
is a particularly knotty case that I hope to address in a future paper. 
68 Augustine of Hippo, Trin., sec. 12.4.21-22; The Trinity [399-419], trans. Edmund Hill, 2nd ed. (Hyde Park, 
N.Y.: New City Press, 2012), 429. 
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Whereas the verba of scientia are begotten by a morally oriented will, sapientia enters a 
transcendent frame because it is begotten by the higher love of “charity” (caritas), “poured forth 
in the heart by the Holy Spirit who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5). By charity, one participates in God’s 
own life,69 and so by a long apprenticeship, all the Christian’s loves may be brought into this frame 
so that scientia will flow seamlessly into sapientia as one refers the goodness of all things to the 
originating goodness of God, loving them in God, with him rather than our temporal purposes 
being the horizon of their meaning.70 To be truly wise, in Augustine’s sense, is to live from within 
the life of God according to the self-donative love that is the life of the Trinity, and to know 
according to the Wisdom by finding in each created thing a glimmer of the aeternas rationes, 
which are one in God’s eternal Wisdom—i.e. Christ, the second person of the Trinity. Sapientia, 
then, is not simply a matter of having a connected view of things, nor only of knowing the causes 
of things; it is a configuration of the mind according to God, actualized in a relationship with God. 
In this, one lives fully as God’s image by remembering, understanding, and loving the Trinity in 
direct relationship.71 By this active participation in God’s own life, the “mapping” of human 
memoria becomes a living sign and image not first of the world nor of one’s worldly purposes, but 
of Christ, who is God’s own self-knowledge. The wisdom begotten in this memoria is a vision 
beyond words, a contemplation beyond representation, received in relationship. This is what it is 
most fully to eat from the Tree of Life (Prov. 3:18; Jn 17:3).72 
Here we come to what I tentatively propose as a fundamental limitation of the neural network. 
While scientia can be uplifted into sapientia within the human mind, I would argue—tentatively—
that the interior structure of the neural network, considered as artifactual memoria, cannot. This is 
because, simply, the outputs of the network—when they dictate human action—do so in terms of 
exterior acts (sell stock), or world-associated categories (thunderstorm). This is why the network’s 
performance is objectively measurable, generating the learning signal by which its weights are 
adjusted. Such an artifact cannot represent or point to caritas because caritas is a reality measured 
not firstly by world-definable ends and actions but by an interior embrace of God as one’s friend, 
even spouse. Caritas dictates concrete dispositions in the world but it is not captured by 
classifications and action decisions. Such a transcendent frame can be declared (i.e. we could train 
a network to infer and comment upon one’s ordering of loves) but it cannot be captured except in 
terms of its effects in the world. Networks do not have real subjectively alive relationships in 
Augustine’s sense. 
Without a sensitivity to caritas, the network cannot become an artifactual sapientia. The human 
observer might reframe the network’s meaning beyond its original instrumentality. One might even 
develop a network to facilitate contemplation of the natural world as a refraction of divine wisdom. 
However, as memoria—that is, within the intentional frame by which it maps from the world to 
world-measurable human purposes—it could not be said to represent the rationes of created things 
as referring to God. On the part of the human being, the meaning of the network could perhaps be 
 
69 David Vincent Meconi, “Augustine’s Doctrine of Deification,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 
ed. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 208–28, 
http://universitypublishingonline.org/ref/id/companions/CCO9781139178044A023; Ron Haflidson, “We Shall Be 
That Seventh Day,” in Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition, ed. Jared Ortiz (Washington, D.C: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2019), 169–89. 
70 Augustine of Hippo, De Doctrina Christiana [396-426], ed. Josef Martin and Klaus-D. Daur, CCSL 32 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), sec. I.3.3-I.4.4. 
71 Augustine of Hippo, Trin., bk. 14. 
72 Augustine of Hippo, Gen. Ad Litt., sec. 8.5.9-11. 
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held open to something more, but here it would not be memoria but only a sign incomplete in itself 
because it is unable to accommodate a transcendent frame in the trace of its interior.73 
2.3. The Two Trees: Our Choice in Using AI 
It is fitting to conclude this paper by recalling Peter Norvig’s suggestion, that we might rightly be 
satisfied with statistical AI, which “describes what does happen” but “doesn’t answer the question 
of why,” even to the point of bearing no relation to the natural generative processes that give rise 
to the predicted phenomenon.74 I suggest that such satisfaction would be dangerous, because the 
opacity of the network’s “reasoning” lends itself to becoming a replacement for rather than an 
invitation to the world, reducing our engagement with the world to the scope of our desires and 
intentions—to the point that we risk rewriting the world itself as a resource for the accomplishment 
of our designs, with ourselves rather than divine Wisdom as its ultimate ratio. This paper cannot 
fully expound these familiar themes; here I but gesture to a landscape that demands re-exploration 
in light of AI. 
We deal with the network in terms of outputs for which our own goals are the necessary framing. 
The network’s interior—even as an echo of memoria—is recondite. It is manifested first to us by 
the network’s responses to various inputs, somewhat as an animal’s instincts are manifested in its 
behavior. Like these instincts, which must be studied and tested and even then not fully understood, 
the network—seen from without—suggests its implicit “concepts” but hides them from our view. 
An animal does not judge the world; it does not theorize about but works within the reality with 
which it interacts. Similarly, the neural network, for all its sophisticated ability to predict data 
correlations that we might never have imagined, remains in this sense at the level of the animal. 
We, on the other hand, ask about reality because it is by judgment that we come to understand. 
We can see the animal as an invitation to judgment: acting according to its own ratio, the animal 
is itself a mapping of the world that we might judge. But the neural network invites our judgment 
especially because it ultimately concerns us, who have determined the outputs of interest. The 
network is not a theory or explanation of the world, but itself something to be theorized and 
conceptualized. At best, it may help us to interrogate our own purposes, or it may redirect us (as 
with the ridged stalks) to the meaning of the world. At worst, it may hide the world from us by 
hiding its own workings except for its efficacious aid to our own goals. 
The interior behavior of artificial neural networks suggests a rich ontology well accounted-for 
by Augustine’s rationes. On the other hand, if the opaque network becomes a buffer between us 
and the world, then we risk a very different assumed ontology. The ancient Babylonians, un-
wondering masters of data-fitting, sought exacting astrological forecasts but showed no interest in 
astronomical mechanisms.75 Their cultural orientation matched their cosmogony, in which the 
world was fashioned from the bisected carcass of a primordial chaos dragon, slain by her own 
descendants and held together by ever-vigilant heavenly guardians.76 It is not a world that invites 
 
73 The question of the network as a predictor and hence a representer of human behavior is intriguing. The love 
of human beings that frames the meaning of their behavior and of their artifacts is ambiguous, almost outwardly 
incoherent, in that it is shaped both by caritas and by covetousness, by humble love and the self-defeating autonomy 
of pride. 
74 Norvig, “On Chomsky.” Emphasis original. 
75 Philip Ball, “Stop Calling the Babylonians Scientists,” The Atlantic, February 10, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/02/babylonians-scientists/462150/; Pearl, “Limitations.” 
76 James B. Pritchard, ed., “The Creation Epic [Enuma Elish],” in The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts 
and Pictures, 1958, 31–39. 
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science because it is not a world that requites wonder. Redolent of menace, it is not to be 
understood but only to be controlled.77 
Our stance of will toward the world shapes our own implicit practical ontology, a reading of 
the world’s rationes and a particular actualization of its capacity for meaning. If statistical AI is 
used as an unexamined instrument of reduction, harnessing the world without understanding, then 
we shall become practical Babylonians, the instrumental framing of the network dominating our 
framing of the world itself. As John Cavadini puts it, for Augustine “[t]he sign systems we create 
are no better than the love in which they were ultimately begotten.”78 And a love that values the 
world merely for its amenability to AI-driven mastery is a love closed to sapientia. Such a love 
will fast decline from scientia into mere superbia (“pride”), the fatuous science of false autonomy 
that reduces all to the scope of our perceived desires, so as to live the lie of self-complete 
dependence on nothing—as if we were gods (Gn 3:5). The artificial neural network can serve our 
sapiential tasting of the tree of life although it cannot capture that wisdom; but if permitted to 
delimit our relationship to the world—it will become the mere tree of knowledge, denying to us 
all that cannot be represented by the instrumental structures by which we have cultivated the 
network’s activity and rendered it intelligible. Is this not the basic dynamic of AI bias? A network 
tells us what we already “know” because we train it to reduce the world as we do; or it reduces the 
world in ways we do not notice because our purposes are shaped by the reductive character of our 
own biases. 
What, then, must we do? We must inquire of the world—and we must let the network lead us 
back to it by inquiring into the network, by striving to understand its working and by refusing the 
easy claim that it bears no relation to the generative processes of nature itself. In that it must reckon 
in some sense with the rationes that have divine Wisdom as their source, the network that cannot 
accommodate the fullness of the world can still perhaps lead us to it by routes unexpected. 
This leads us to the use of artificial intelligence as a spiritual activity. Our behavior and goals 
are the inescapable framing of the network itself; and so our deployment of these artifacts must 
imitate God’s providential governance of the universe—arranging and further elucidating the 
rationes to yield meanings that they cannot possess simply on their own. As we undertake this 
godlike activity, will we seek greater understanding or only greater efficacy? Let us not be harsh 
imperators of an unstable world. Instead, we must seek an unveiling of the dynamics of creation 
for use according to their intrinsic goodness and meaning. The network maps natural things to 
conventional meanings, but if we return to the world, we prevent those meanings from merely 
signifying ourselves. The right use of AI does not depend merely on the architecture of our systems, 
nor even on the ethics that we attempt to embed in them, but on the ultimate stance of will that we 
adopt—be it superbia or caritas, unto a false knowledge or a true scientia and, finally, wisdom. 
This is the challenge of AI, our moral framing of which will determine what of reality we permit 
ourselves to see. 
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